1.Member States shall require any person who proposes to acquire, directly or indirectly, a qualifying holding in an investment firm first to inform the competent authorities, telling them of the size of his intended holding. Such a person shall likewise inform the competent authorities if he proposes to increase his qualifying holding so that the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital that he holds would reach or exceed 20, 33, or 50 % or so that the investment firm would become his subsidiary. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, the competent authorities shall have up to three months from the date of the notification provided for in the first subparagraph to oppose such a plan if, in view of the need to ensure sound and prudent management of the investment firm, they are not satisfied as to the suitability of the person referred to in the first subparagraph. If they do not oppose the plan, they may fix a deadline for its implementation.
2.If the acquirer of the holding referred to in paragraph 1 is an investment firm authorized in another Member State or the parent undertaking of an investment firm authorized in another Member State or a person controlling an investment firm authorized in another Member State and if, as a result of that acquisition, the firm in which the acquirer proposes to acquire a holding would become the acquirer's subsidiary or come under his control, the assessment of the acquisition must be the subject of the prior consultation provided for in Article 6.
3.Member States shall require any person who proposes to dispose, directly or indirectly, of a qualifying holding in an investment firm first to inform the competent authorities, telling them of the size of his holding. Such a person shall likewise inform the competent authorities if he proposes to reduce his qualifying holding so that the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held by him would fall below 20, 33 or 50 % or so that the investment firm would cease to be his subsidiary.
4.On becoming aware of them, investment firms shall inform the competent authorities of any acquisitions or disposals of holdings in their capital that cause holdings to exceed or fall below any of the thresholds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3. At least once a year they shall also inform the competent authorities of the names of shareholders and members possessing qualifying holdings and the sizes of such holdings as shown, for example, by the information received at annual general meetings of shareholders and members or as a result of compliance with the regulations applicable to companies listed on stock exchanges.
5.Member States shall require that, where the influence exercised by the persons referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of an investment firm, the competent authorities take appropriate measures to put an end to that situation. Such measures may consist, for example, in injunctions, sanctions against directors and those responsible for management or suspension of the exercise of the voting rights attaching to the shares held by the shareholders or members in question. Similar measures shall apply to persons failing to comply with the obligation to provide prior information imposed in paragraph 1. If a holding is acquired despite the opposition of the competent authorities, the Member States shall, regardless of any other sanctions to be adopted, provide either for exercise of the corresponding voting rights to be suspended, for the nullity of the votes cast or for the possibility of their annulment.