(10)Article 325bh(1), point (i), and Article 325j of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 contain specific conditions for the calculation of the own funds requirements for exposures to Collective Investment Undertakings (‘CIU’), both under the alternative standardised approach and the alternative internal model approach. To avoid a very conservative treatment, credit institutions must be able to periodically look through all the components of the CIU underlying the exposure and calculate the own funds requirements for the CIU exposure as if they had direct exposures to the CIU components. The banks’ ability to carry out the look-through approach is predicated on the availability of the CIU composition data at the look-through date, which has so far proven very challenging because CIU managers, due to confidentiality concerns, have little incentive to provide granular, detailed information on CIU composition. As a result, credit institutions are often unable to use the look-through methodology under either of the approaches and would often have to revert to a conservative treatment. Other major jurisdictions have therefore proposed amendments to the treatment of the CIU exposures under both the FRTB standardised and the internal model approaches. Hence, to avoid distortions to the level playing field and a disproportionate operational burden for using the look-through approach, it is necessary to introduce, in line with other jurisdictions, the flexibility for institutions to conduct a partial look-through and to that end, specify a minimum threshold for that partial look-through, while requiring those institutions to use a more conservative treatment for the CIU part that cannot be looked through. The design of that minimum threshold should be specified in relation to the market value of the exposure to allow for simplicity. Where the market value of the exposure is not appropriate for specific CIU exposures, such as highly leveraged ones, credit institutions should reflect that in their look-through approach to the satisfaction of their competent authorities. A lower frequency of the look-through should also be specified. Moreover, under the alternative internal model approach, credit institutions should be allowed to use alternative methodologies to the look-through, subject to approval from their competent authorities. For CIU exposures subject to vega risk, the look-through approach is complex to implement and is not aligned with the way credit institutions are risk managing those positions, as vega sensitivities are not additive and cannot be decomposed in a straightforward manner. CRR provisions require, however, that credit institutions use the same approach for the calculation of the own funds requirements for market risk for all the risk factors of the same CIU exposure. Therefore, a credit institution that uses for such a CIU position the look-through approach to calculate the capital requirements for its delta risk factor is required to use the look-through approach for the capital requirements for the vega risk factor. To alleviate institutions’ operational burden, such credit institutions should be allowed to use an alternative approach to calculate the own funds requirements for the vega risk factor of a CIU exposure, regardless of the approach employed for capitalising other types of risk associated with that exposure.